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Abstract—We design and analyze a mechanism for forming
coalitions of peers in a data swarming system where peers have
heterogeneous upload capacities. A coalition is a set of peers
that explicitly cooperate with other peers inside the coalition
via choking, data replication, and capacity allocation strategies.
Further, each peer interacts with other peers outside its coalition
via potentially distinct choking, data replication, and capacity
allocation strategies. Following on our preliminary work in [18]
that demonstrated significant performance benefits of coalitions,
we present here a comprehensive analysis of the choking and
data replication strategies for coalitions.
We first develop an analytical model to understand a simple
random choking strategy as a within-coalition strategy and
show that it accurately predicts a coalition’s performance. Our
analysis formally shows that the random choking strategy can
help a coalition achieve near-optimal performance by optimally
choosing the re-choking interval lengths and the number unchoke
slots. Further, our analytical model can be easily adapted to
model a BitTorrent-like swarm. We also introduce a simple
data replication strategy which significantly improves data avail-
ability within a coalition as compared to the rarest-first piece
replication strategy employed in BitTorrent systems. We further
propose a cooperation-aware better response strategy that achieves
convergence of the dynamic coalition formation process when
peers freely join or leave any coalition. Finally, using extensive
simulations, we demonstrate improvements in the performance
of a swarming system due to coalition formation.
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been many recent studies on BitTorrent-like
swarming systems, mainly via modeling, measurement, and
simulation (see for example, [1], [3], [4], [6], [9], [14]).
However, there is still a lack of significant understanding of
cooperative behavior and its impact on swarming systems,
except a very few studies viz. [7], [12], [18]. Following on our
initial study in [18], we formally investigate cooperative peer
behavior in swarming systems through analytical modeling,
design and extensive simulations.
Similar to most existing works (e.g., [11]), we consider a
swarming system where there is a content publisher (i.e. an
initial seed) that never leaves the system and serves a file
(divided into a set of pieces) to a heterogeneous population of
peers with different upload capacities. Besides downloading
from the publisher, peers also exchange pieces of the shared
file among themselves. Since a basic functionality of a data
swarming system is to let users download data, we investigate
whether explicit cooperation among a group of peers can sig-
nificantly reduce their file download completion time. Such a
group is referred to as a coalition [18]. Each peer in a coalition
cooperates with other peers inside the coalition via choking,
data replication, and capacity allocation strategies. Further,
each peer interacts with other peers outside its coalition via
potentially distinct choking, data replication, and capacity
allocation strategies. Our initial study [18] demonstrates that a
coalition of peers not only significantly reduces the individual
peer download completion times, but also yields performance
benefits to the whole swarm. As mentioned in [18], the
notion of coalitions differs from that of clusters studied in
[8], which are formed as a consequence of the selfish nature
of peers and the Tit-for-Tat strategy. Unlike a coalition, the
lack of cooperation between peers in a cluster can degrade
the performance of the peers in the cluster [4]. Another
related but different notion is that of a buddy group proposed
in [7]. However, we have shown in [18] that our coalition
design significantly outperforms the choking strategy adopted
by peers in a buddy group.
The present work differs from our initial work [18] in the
following important ways:
1) We present an analytical model for investigating the
random choking strategy used by peers in a coalition.
Our model takes into consideration that a peer may
concurrently download multiple distinct pieces, which
is not considered in [18]. We also explicitly model the
impact of re-choking interval lengths (i.e., the duration
of time elapsed before a peer decides on a new set of
peers to unchoke) and the number of unchoke slots on
the coalition performance, whereas in [18], the impact
of these two key parameters is only observed via simu-
lations.
2) We then use the analytical model to optimally design a
coalition. In particular, our model yields optimal values
of the re-choking interval length and the number of
unchoke slots in each re-choke interval. Such a model-
based optimal design is an important distinction of this
work from [18].
3) In order to improve data availability, we introduce a
Peer-balance Rarest-first Piece Selection strategy for
data replication in a coalition. Data availability has not
been studied in [18].
4) Using extensive simulations on a data set of peer upload
capacities collected from real-world swarming systems,
we explore the impact of forming coalitions on the
overall performance of a swarm, and investigate whether
coalitions can be dynamically reached in practice, as
peers enter and leave the system. In [18], simulations
are only conducted on synthetic data sets of two capacity
classes of peers.
A. Main Results
We make the following important contributions in this paper.
1) We introduce a detailed analytical model of a coalition
in data swarming systems. This analytical model can be
easily adapted to study different choking strategies for
coalitions, and even to a general BitTorrent-like swarm.
Using our model, we analyze the impact of the length of
re-choking intervals and the number of unchoke slots on
the system performance. Further, these two parameters
can be optimally chosen based on our model so as to
minimize the average download completion time.
2) Using our analytical model, we observe that a coalition
of peers adopting a simple random choking strategy
as the within-coalition choking strategy exhibits near-
optimal performance. This is particularly appealing since
(i) the random choking strategy is simple and easily
implementable in a distributed fashion by peers in a
coalition, and (ii) finding an optimal choking strategy
appears infeasible.
3) We further propose a data replication strategy and show
that it significantly outperforms the conventional rarest-
first strategy in terms of data availability in a coalition.
4) Using extensive simulations with a real-world data set of
peer upload capacities, we show that coalitions improve
the overall performance of a swarm if the majority of
peers form a coalition. Furthermore, we propose an
improved cooperation-aware better response strategy
(from the scheme proposed in [18]) that achieves con-
vergence of the coalition size (i.e., number of peers in
the coalition), even when peers are allowed to freely join
or leave any coalition.
Related work. This paper follows on our initial study on
coalitions in [18]. Modeling the swarm as a sequence of
download stages or stations first appeared in Menasche et al
[11]. Tian et al [17] study peer distribution as a function of
the fraction of downloaded file. The models in [4] [6] also
study the steady state of a swarming system. [5] attempts to
minimize average finish time in P2P networks, but it assumes
that the shared file is broken into infinitesimally small pieces
such that there is no forwarding delay. Rafit et al [7] propose
a buddy protocol for peers to form buddy groups (similar
to coalitions). Basics of dynamic coalition formation and the
cooperative game theory framework can be found in [16] [2]
[10] [15]. Misra et al [12] studies cooperation in peer-assisted
services, but their model is not applicable to the swarming
systems of interest in this paper.
B. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We outline
the overall coalition design in Section II. In Section III,
we introduce our analytical model that accurately predicts
the file download time of a coalition and also yields the
optimal parameter settings. In Section IV, we present our
data replication strategy among peers in a coalition, and show
that it improves data availability significantly. In Section V,
using simulations we demonstrate that coalitions improve data
swarming performance as a whole. Finally, we conclude in
Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES: OVERVIEW OF COALITION DESIGN
In this section, we briefly review the overall system design
of a coalition (introduced in [18]). Throughout this paper, a
coalition is defined to be a set of peers that cooperate with each
other within the set and interact with peers not in the set, both
according to a choking strategy, a piece selection strategy,
and an upload capacity allocation strategy. Different from
[18], we allow peers in a coalition to have different upload
capacities. As for a coalition, we ideally would like to design
the choking, capacity allocation and piece selection strategies
so as to minimize the average file download completion time
of the peers in a coalition. However, our focus in this paper is
primarily on designing an efficient choking and piece selection
strategies. Recall that the upload capacity allocation strategy
specifies how a peer determines the fraction of its upload
capacity that is allocated to each of its downloaders. As in
[18], we assume that a peer does not allocate capacity to peers
outside its coalition, and equally splits its upload capacity
among all of its downloaders in the same coalition. A detailed
study of more general capacity allocation strategies is a topic
for future work.
For completeness, we describe preliminaries introduced
in [18]. We also re-state our random choking strategy for
a coalition, which will be analyzed in detail in subsequent
sections.
A. Choking Strategy
In BitTorrent-like swarming systems, a peer unchokes a
fixed number of peers at points in time spaced δt units apart.
This interval δt is referred to as the re-choking interval. The
choking strategy of a peer in a coalition determines the set of
peers that this peer unchokes, and consists of two rules: one
for dealing with peers in the same coalition, referred to as the
within-coalition choking strategy; and the other for dealing
with peers outside the coalition. The within-coalition choking
strategy proposed in [18] is as follows. Each peer in a coalition
uniformly at random unchokes k other peers in the same
coalition every δt time units. We refer to this strategy as the
random choking strategy. In our previous work [18], the values
of δt and k were empirically chosen to minimize the average
download completion time for a coalition. In this paper, we
give a detailed analytical model that yields the optimal values
for δt and k. A basic requirement is that the values of k
and δt should be chosen so that a peer can upload at least
a complete piece to each of its data receivers. Regarding the
rule to deal with peers outside a coalition, for simplicity, we
assume in this paper that each peer chokes all other peers
outside its coalition. Note that a peer in a coalition can still
receive data from peers outside the coalition when the peer
is optimistically unchoked by other peers. Studying different
strategies for interacting with peers outside a coalition is a
topic for future investigation.
We now proceed to describe our analytical model of choking
strategy for coalitions.
III. MODEL AND DESIGN OF CHOKING STRATEGY
We now introduce an analytical model that enables analysis
of the random choking strategy. This model differs from the
one in [18] in that this model explicitly models the impact
of re-choking interval δt and the number of unchoke slots k
on the performance of a coalition. As we will see, our model
yields the optimal values of δt and k, which were observed
only via simulations in our previous work [18].
A. Assumptions and Steady State Representation of a Swarm
As in [18], we assume that peers arrive to the system
according to a Poisson process with rate λ, and each peer has
an upload capacity of up 1. We use the random variable (r.v.)N
to denote the total number of peers in the system. We assume
that all peers are interested in the same file, which is divided
into B pieces. There is an initial seed (or content publisher)
with upload capacity us in the system, and it never leaves
the system. On the other hand, each peer leaves the system
immediately after it has received all the pieces of the file. The
data swarm can be modeled as a queuing system with B + 1
M/G/∞ queues. The i-th queue (with i = 0, 1, 2, ...B− 1, B),
also referred to as download stage i, consists of peers in
possession of exactly i pieces. Let r.v. Ni denote the number
of peers in the i-th queue and N¯i its expectation. Peers in the
i-th queue jump in the j-th queue with rate βij . In steady state,
dN¯i(t)/dt = 0, ∀i = 0, 1, 2, ..., B − 1, i.e., the arrival and the
departure rates of peers for a given queue are identical.
Let γij = βij/N¯i. In other words, γij denotes the transition
rate of an arbitrary peer in i-th queue to j-th queue. The reason
for introducing γij is because βij depends on the downloading
rates of individual peers in the i-th queue. In other words, once
we know the downloading rates, we can easily calculate βij .
Further, it is intuitive to relate an individual peer’s download
rate to coalition parameters such as δt or k, as will become
clear later in the section. To calculate γij , we need to compute
downloading rate of a peer and the fraction of time it actively
downloads data in each queue.
The arrival rate of peers to queue i (where i = 1, ..., B) is
given by
λi =
i−1∑
ℓ=0
βℓi =
i−1∑
ℓ=0
γℓiN¯ℓ (1)
and the departure rate of peers from queue i (where i =
0, 1, ..., B − 1) is given by
µi =
B∑
ℓ=i+1
βiℓ = N¯i
B∑
ℓ=i+1
γiℓ (2)
1Note that up can also be thought of as the average upload capacity of all
peers with heterogeneous capacities.
Note that for queue 0, we have λ0 = λ, which is the arrival
rate of peers to the coalition. Similarly, for queue B, we have
µB = ∞, as we assume that peers immediately leave the
system once finish downloading.
In steady state, the arrival rate of peers to queue i is equal
to the departure rate of peers leaving from queue i. Thus,
i−1∑
ℓ=0
γℓiN¯ℓ = N¯i
B−1∑
ℓ=i+1
γiℓ (3)
In the following, we model the transition rates γi,j and N¯i
as functions of δt and k. As shown later, solving the set of
equations given in (3) yields the optimal values of δt and k
that minimize the expected download completion time.
For simplicity, we use the following notational simplifica-
tion in the remainder of this section. We use P (X) to represent
P (X = 1), where X is an indicator r.v.
B. Re-choking Interval δt
Let pi and pj denote arbitrary peers in the i-th and the j-
th queues respectively. Suppose that pj randomly unchokes
k other peers in each re-choking interval δt. Let U¯j denote
the average per-connection upload rate of pj . Then, it takes
1/U¯j seconds for pj to completely send one piece to each of
its downloaders. Suppose that pi is unchoked by pj during
a re-choking interval δt. During this re-choking interval, pj
continues to download data from other peers and may transit
to another queue upon downloading one or more pieces. Let
D¯j (=
∑B
ℓ=j+1 γjℓ) denote its transition rate out of queue j.
Then the effective time interval that pj unchokes pi (while
pj is still in queue j) is given by min(δt, 1/D¯j). We can
divide this effective time interval into ϕj time slots, each long
enough for pj to completely upload a piece to a downloader.
More formally, ϕj = max
(
1,min(δt, 1/D¯j)/(1/U¯j)
)
.
C. pj’s expected per-connection upload rate U j
Let Bij be an indicator random variable that is set to 1
when pi is “interested” in pj in steady state i.e. pj has one or
more pieces which pi does not. Assume that pj assigns one of
the ϕj slots to pi uniformly at random upon unchoking pi. Let
Bℓij be an indicator random variable that is set to 1 when pi
is interested in pj if pi is in ℓ-th slot unchoked by pj , where
ℓ = 1, ..., ϕj . Note that P (Bℓij) is a conditional probability. It
follows that
P (Bij) =
( ϕj∑
ℓ=1
P (Bℓij)
)
/ϕj (4)
In Appendix VII, we describe the calculation of P (Bℓij).
In [18], we assumed that in steady state, the data pieces that
have been downloaded both by pi and pj are chosen from B
pieces independently and uniformly at random. In particular,
we obtain
P (Bij) =
{
1−
(
B−j
i−j
)
/
(
B
i
)
, if i ≥ j,
1, if i < j.
(5)
However, in our current model, (5) is true only when pi is
unchoked by pj and is assigned the first slot. Since pi can
be assigned any of the ϕj slots in a re-choking interval, (4)
represents a more accurate calculation of P (Bij), as compared
to (5).
We assume that all k out-connections of pj are assigned to
other peers independently, and any out-connection is assigned
uniformly at random to all other peers in the system. Let ηj
denote the probability that an out-connection of pj is active,
i.e., there is ongoing data transmission over the connection.
Note that an out-connection may not be active if the unchoked
peer is not interested in the data possessed by pj . Then,
ηj=
B−1∑
i=0
N¯i · P (Bij)/
(B−1∑
ℓ=0
N¯ℓ
)
(6)
We finally obtain the expected per-connection upload rate as
U j=
k∑
w=1
up
w
(
k
w
)
ηwj (1 − ηj)
k−w (7)
D. The data transfer connection from pj to pi.
Let Sij be an indicator random variable that is set to 1 if
the connection from pj queue to pi is active. Per the random
choking strategy, each peer in the coalition unchokes another
peer in the coalition chosen uniformly at random.
Let Aij be an indicator random variable that is set to 1 if
pj unchokes pi in an rechoking interval δt. It follows that
P (Aij) =
k∑
w=1
(1 − p)w−1p (8)
where p = 1/
∑B−1
ℓ=0 N¯ℓ.
Finally,
P (Sij) = P (Aij)P (Bij)
E. Transition Rates γij
Consider an arbitrary peer pi in queue i. Depending on the
number of active download connections of pi, it can transit
to any queue j, where i < j ≤ B. Let qℓi denote the
probability that pi has ℓ active download connections (each
of which is downloading a distinct piece), and let Dℓi denote
the download rate per piece. Assuming that all ℓ connections
complete their piece transfers at about the same time, then pi
will jump to queue i+ ℓ with transition rate qℓiDℓi . The exact
calculation of qℓi and Dℓi is computationally very expensive,
as it involves an exponential number of combinatorial terms.
For instance, consider the case when ℓ = 3. We need to
consider all possible combinations of queues that originate
these 3 active connections. As an example, the probability of
the event that the connections are from queues 2, 3, 4 is given
by P (Si,2)P (Si,3)P (Si,4). Further, the active connections
have data rates U¯2, U¯3, U¯4. Since the exact computation of
download rates of peers is not practical, we approximate the
transition rates as follows.
Let N¯up denote the expected number of peers uploading
data in the system in steady state. Then,
N¯up =
B−1∑
j=1
N¯j (9)
We exclude peers in queue 0 from the calculation of N¯up,
since these peers do not have a complete piece yet.
Recall that P (Sij) denotes the probability that peer pi
has an active in-connection from pj , an arbitrary peer in
queue j, and is a function of i and j. We approximate the
system by assuming that all peers in various queues have
identical probabilities of their upload-connections being active
when attempting data transfer to pi. Let P (Si) denote this
probability, which is given by
P (Si) =
(B−1∑
j=1
N¯jP (Sij)
)
/N¯up (10)
Remarks. Note that (10) represents the probability that an
arbitrary in-connection of pi is active, whereas (6) represents
the probability that an arbitrary out-connection of pj is active.
(10) is simply an approximation to the system, while (6)
follows immediately from the random choking strategy.
Let U¯ denote the expected (steady-state) per-connection
upload rate averaged over all peers in the system. Then,
U¯ =
(B−1∑
j=1
N¯jU¯j
)
/N¯up (11)
Let Wi denote the the number of active in-connections of pi.
If Wi = w, then pi will transit from queue i to queue i+ w.
Thus, we have i+ 1 ≤ i+w ≤ B and w ≤ N¯up − 1. Let W˜i
denote the upper bound on Wi. It is easy to see that W˜i =
min(B− i,
∑B−1
ℓ=0 N¯ℓ− 1). Therefore, Wi follows a truncated
binomial distribution with parameter
(
N¯up, P (Si)
)
with an
upper bound given by W˜i. Thus, the probability that w in-
connections are active is given by
P (Wi = w) =
(
N¯
w
)
P (Si)
w(1−P (Si))
N¯−w
/ W˜i∑
ℓ=1
P (Wi = ℓ)
(12)
Assuming that the w connections start and complete piece
transfers at the same time, γi,i+w can be calculated as
γi,i+w =
(
U¯ · P (Wi = w)
)/ W˜i∑
ℓ=1
P (Wi = ℓ) (13)
Let P (i, i + w) denote the probability that pi directly transit
from queue i to queue j in one hop, i.e.,
P (i, i+ w) = P (Wi = w) (14)
Remarks. Note that our model assumes that a peer has the
same expected per-connection download rate when in different
queues in steady state. However, different peers are allowed
to have different departure rates when they are in different
queues. For an arbitrary peer in i-th queue, its departure rate
is given by
∑B
ℓ=i+1 γiℓ, and the time it spends in the i-th
queue is exponentially distributed with mean 1/
∑B
ℓ=i+1 γiℓ.
F. Download completion time
Based on the analysis in Sections III-B, III-C, III-D, III-E,
we can now solve the set of equations given in (3) to find:
• the expected number of peers in each queue in steady
state,
• the probability that a peer in i-th queue is concurrently
downloading w pieces, i.e., P (i, i+w), ∀i and 1 ≤ w ≤
B − i,
• the expected transition rates γij with i = 0, 1, ..., B − 1
and j = i+ 1, ..., B.
We can then compute the expected download completion time
of a peer in steady state as follows.
Let Ti denote the expected remaining download completion
time of a peer in the i-th queue. The expected time that a peer
stays in the i-th queue is given by 1/
∑B
ℓ=i+1 γiℓ. We can now
compute Ti recursively as follows:
Ti=
(
1/
B∑
ℓ=i+1
γiℓ
)
+
B∑
ℓ=i+1
P (i, ℓ) · Tℓ (15)
i = 0, 1, ..., B − 2
TB−1=
(
1/γB−1,B
) (16)
Thus T0 gives us the expected download completion time of
a newly arrived peer. T0 can be efficiently computed using
dynamic programming.
Note that a special case of this model occurs when a
peer makes exactly B transitions during the downloading
process, i.e., visits each queue exactly once. This case has
been considered in the simple model for coalition choking
strategy in our previous work [18].
G. Model Validation
We next validate our analytical model by comparing its nu-
merical results with extensive simulations of a coalition using
the random choking strategy. Throughout our simulations, we
model the arrival of peers to the swarm as a Poisson process
with an arrival rate of 20 peers/minute. Both the initial seed’s
and peers’ upload capacities are set to 0.5 pieces/second. The
seed’s duration of re-choking interval is set to 10 seconds,
and we vary the re-choking interval from 10 − 30 seconds.
We consider a file with B = 60 pieces. Each simulation lasts
a duration of 4000 seconds, and we obtain data from the steady
state (3000− 4000 seconds) when the number of peers in the
system is stablized.
Figure 1 compares the numerical results computed from our
model with the simulation results. Figure 1 shows that for a
given value of δt, there indeed exists an optimal value of k,
the number of unchoking slots. For example, when δt = 10
seconds, the optimal value of k is around 4. We find that
our model results in general matches well with the simulation
results.
Figure 2 shows the numerical results of our model for differ-
ent re-choking interval lengths. We see that when the number
of unchoke slots is around 5, the expected download comple-
tion time is the lowest for δt = 20, 30 seconds, and close to the
lowest for δt = 10 seconds. Note that in Figure 2, the lower
bound for download completion time is 120 seconds, as the
file size is B = 60 pieces and up = 0.5 piece/second. When k
is small (less than 4), the expected download completion time
is shorter when δt = 10 seconds than δt = 20, 30 seconds.
This is because that longer re-choking interval can lead to
decreased interestedness of a downloader in its data uploaders,
i.e., P (Bij) decreases with increasing δt. However, as k gets
larger, the decreased interestedness can be compensated for
by an increased probability that a peer is unchoked by some
other peer, i.e., P (Aij) increases with k. This is apparent in
Figure 2 where the expected completion times across different
re-choking intervals approach each other when k is large. In
the extreme case when the number of unchoke slots is very
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Fig. 1. Comparison of download completion time between our model and
simulations with B = 60 pieces. Top plot shows the case when δt = 10
seconds, and the second plot is for δt = 20 seconds. The boxplots show
the simulation results, where the line in each box represents the median,
and the upper and lower edges of each box corresponds to the 25th and
75th percentiles respectively, and each ’*’ mark shows the average download
completion time. The diamonds show numerical results from our model.
large (e.g., 30), the re-choking interval has no impact on the
system performance. This is intuitive, as each peer is always
unchoked by all other peers.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30120
130
140
150
160
170
180
do
wn
lo
ad
 c
om
pl
et
io
n 
tim
e 
(se
c)
number of unchoke slots
 
 
re−choking interval = 10sec
re−choking interval = 20sec
re−choking interval = 30sec
Fig. 2. Download completion time predicted by our model for B = 60.
1) Implications of The Model: Our analytical model il-
lustrates that indeed there exist optimal values for δt and k
when peers adopt the random choking strategy. Note that our
model does not try to find an optimal within-coalition choking
strategy for a coalition. Instead, our model demonstrates that
even the simple random choking strategy can yield near
optimal performance. This is quite appealing, as the simple
random choking strategy can be easily implemented in a
distributed way at virtually no cost. A system designer can
simply use our model to find the optimal values of δt and k
for given values of file size, and peers’ arrival rate.
H. Extensions of The Model
We note that our model can be generalized to other
BitTorrent-like swarming system. For example, in our previous
work [18], we find P (Sij) (probability of the connection from
pj to pi being active) and U¯j (per-connection upload rate from
pj) for a BitTorrent swarm. If we plug these equations into
our model, we can analyze the performance of a BitTorrent
swarm. Second, for a coalition of peers with heterogeneous
upload capacities, we can simply use the average capacity
over all the peers in the coalition as the up in our model. A
more correct analysis would involve dividing the coalition into
multiple capacity classes, each class consisting of peers with
approximately the same upload capacities, and then treat each
queue as a system of multiple queues, each corresponding to
a capacity class. We can then apply the analytical machinery
described in this section to analyze the system. Nevertheless,
our simulations in Section V show that a coalition with het-
erogeneous peers can also significantly improve performance.
IV. PIECE SELECTION STRATEGY IMPROVES DATA
AVAILABILITY OF COALITION
A. Strategy Design
In this section, we propose a piece selection strategy (for
data replication in a coalition) to improve the data availability
within a coalition. This strategy is referred to as Peer-Balance
Rarest-First Piece Selection strategy. This strategy specifies
that, a peer in a coalition first finds the set S of pieces which
are the rarest across the whole coalition (i.e., those pieces are
possessed by the least number of peers in the coalition), when
requesting pieces from other peers. Furthermore, when a peer
finds that there is more than one piece in S, then for each piece
k ∈ S and among all peers missing k, this peer identifies the
peer with the least number of pieces, denoted by mk. Then,
the peer selects a piece b∗ ∈ S to request for download, where
b∗ satisfies mb∗ = mink∈Smk. Intuitively, this strategy gives
the highest priority to the rarest piece (among all pieces in the
rarest set) which is not possessed by the peer (denoted by pb∗)
that possesses the smallest number of pieces. Thus, pb∗ will be
more likely to find an available piece to download in future.
In contrast, in BitTorrent’s rarest-first policy, a peer arbitrarily
chooses a piece to request from among all pieces in the rarest
set.
We illustrate our strategy using the following example.
Table I depicts matrix V whose rows represent pieces of the
file, and the columns represent the peers. vij (the (i, j)-th
entry of V ) is set to 1 if peer i has piece j, and 0 otherwise.
Assume that peer 5 is unchoked by peer 6. peer 5 finds that
the two rarest pieces are piece 1 and 3, both only replicated
twice in the swarm. The peers that do not have piece 1 are
peers 2, 3, 4, and 5, each with 3, 2, 3, and 2 pieces respectively.
Among these peers, the peer with the least number of pieces
are peers 3 and 5, each only in possession of 2 pieces, i.e.,
m1 = 2. However, we find m3 = 1, as peer 1 misses piece 3
(a piece in the rarest set) but peer 1 only owns one piece. If
peer 5 selects piece 3 to request for download (from peer 6),
then the poorest peer (i.e., peer 1) in the system now has one
more available piece that it can request in future. However,
if peer 5 requests for piece 1, which peer 1 is not interested
in, then the total number of pieces that are of interest to peer
1 does not increase. Thus, our strategy is “socialist” with the
objective of helping the poorest peers first in order to increase
the overall data availability.
peer 1 peer 2 peer 3 peer 4 peer 5 peer 6
piece 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
piece 2 0 1 1 1 0 0
piece 3 0 0 1 0 0 1
piece 4 0 1 0 1 1 0
piece 5 0 1 0 1 1 0
TABLE I
MATRIX V FOR THE EXAMPLE FOR PIECE SELECTION STRATEGY.
B. Data Availability
We next show how our piece selection strategy helps
improve the data availability in a coalition. Consider a flash
crowd scenario (e.g., in data publishing phase) in which peers
in a coalition request data from an external source before
all distinct pieces have been disseminated into the coalition.
Initially, there is no data piece in the coalition and peers
request and download data from the seed. Once a peer receives
a complete piece, it shares it with other peers in the coalition.
Note that only the seed can provide a new piece to the coalition
over time. Thus, in terms of the cumulative number of distinct
pieces that can be received by the coalition, the best scenario
occurs when the seed’s upload capacity is entirely used to
upload distinct pieces to the coalition. Let t∗ denote the time
when the coalition receives all distinct pieces in this scenario,
and let Nc(t) denote the number of distinct pieces received
by peers in a coalition at time t in the best scenario, with
t ∈ [0, t∗]. Note that Nc(t) serves as an upper bound for
available distinct pieces in the coalition at time t.
Since our data replication strategy always selects a piece that
is missing across the whole coalition, our strategy can achieve
Nc(t). However, it is interesting to note that the rarest-first
strategy (even globally within the coalition) cannot achieve this
upper bound Nc(t). To quantify this difference, we introduce
a metric referred to as availability loss.
Let Nd(t) denote the number of distinct pieces in the
coalition at time t when rarest-first strategy is adopted by peers
in the coalition. We define availability loss, denoted by L(t),
as follows.
L(t) = (Nc(t)−Nd(t))/Nc(t), t ∈ [0, t
∗]
And define average availability loss as
L¯ =
∫ t∗
0
L(t∗)/t∗
We next use simulations to show that the rarest first strategy
can lead to a high average availability loss under certain
conditions. Consider 40 homogeneous peers (with same upload
capacity) that start downloading from an initial seed uniformly
at random in the first 20 seconds of the simulation. The initial
seed’s upload capacity is 1 piece per second (i.e., 0.025 piece
per second per peer). The durations of both re-choking and
optimistic unchoking intervals are set to 40 seconds. Since the
number of peers is large, a peer i will equally likely unchoke
or choke other peers during each re-choking interval. In other
words, any other peer is equally likely to appear in peer i’s
unchoke set (which has 5 peers). Thus, on average, each peer
is roughly unchoked by 5 other peers and its downloading rate
equals to the upload capacity of a single peer.
We consider a global (i.e., within coalition) rarest first
algorithm. That is, a peer selects the rarest piece that has
the least copies among all 40 peers in this swarm. All peers
have the same upload capacity, ranging from 100 to 0.0001
pieces per second. For each upload capacity, we run 10
simulations with different random seeds and calculate the
average availability loss (defined earlier). As shown in Figure
3, we observe that if the peers’ upload capacity is high, there
is almost no availability loss; on the other hand, if the peers’
upload capacity is low, the availability loss is very low. But,
when the peers’ upload capacity is of the same order as the
seed’s upload capacity, the availability loss is large (more than
50 percent).
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Fig. 3. Average availability loss
when 40 peers download 500 pieces
from an initial seed in 1200 seconds.
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Fig. 4. Average number of empty
P \D sets.
The large availability loss observed appears counter-intuitive
at the first glance. However, it can be explained by peers’
piece selection behavior. In BitTorrent-like file sharing, a peer
always requests a piece (from the seed or other peers) that is
in its partially finished set and not being actively downloaded.
Thus, at the time when a peer selects a piece to request from
the seed, if this peer still has a partially finished but not a
currently downloaded piece, then this peer does not choose a
new piece that has not been disseminated into the swarm, even
though it employs the rarest-first policy.
More specifically, let Pi(t) denote the partial set containing
pieces that are partially downloaded by peer i at time t.
Let Di(t) denote the set containing pieces that peer i is
downloading at time t. Clearly Di(t) ⊆ Pi(t). Peer i requests
pieces in Pi(t) \ Di(t), because it wants to finish partially
downloaded pieces first. Since the set P (t) \ D(t) of peers
are often non-empty, peers will frequently request the seed
for pieces that the seed has already sent to other peers in the
coalition. The reason for the non-emptiness of set P (t)\D(t)
is due to the periodic choking and unchoking behavior. Let
EPD denote the average number of empty P \D sets when
peers select pieces to request from the initial seed. We plot
EPD in Figure 4, and find that EPD is negatively correlated
with L¯, which is consistent with our conjecture. We show
further evidence in support of our conjecture by comparing the
number of times that peers have non-empty sets Pi(t) \Di(t)
and the number of received distinct pieces every 10 seconds.
A cross-correlation analysis of the two time series shows that
the maximum lag (with correlation coefficient > 0.9) between
them is 40 seconds which is the average downloading time
from the seed by a single peer. Due to space limits, we present
this result in a technical report. Part of our ongoing research
is to understand why the peak availability loss occurs when
ratio of peer capacity to seed capacity attains a specific value.
V. IMPACT AND STABILITY OF COALITION
In this section, we investigate the impact of coalition on
the performance of a swarm, and unlike [18], we investigate
whether stable coalitions result in a swarm where peers have
heterogeneous capacities. Further, our simulations here employ
data sets collected from real-world swarming systems [13],
unlike [18] which simulates a swarm with two capacity classes.
A. Impact of Coalition On Data Swarming Performance
We now study the impact of coalitions on a population of
peers with heterogeneous upload capacities taken from real-
world data swarms [13]. The distribution of upload capacities
is shown in Figure 5. The figure shows that majority of the
peers in a swarm are low capacity peers. The lowest capacity
is 42.96KBps. 90% of peers have capacity below 391.45KBps,
while very few peers have capacity more than 10MBps.
In our simulations, peers arrive according to a Poisson
process with an arrival rate of 20 peers/minute. If a peer is not
in a coalition, the peer uses the regular BitTorrent algorithms
with δt = 10sec and k = 5 (4 slots for Tit-for-Tat and 1 for
optimistic unchoke). There is one coalition in the system, and
peers in the coalition use the random choking strategy with
δt = 10 seconds and k = 5, the optimal values as determined
by our model. The upload capacities of peers are sampled from
the empirical distribution given in Figure 5. The seed’s upload
capacity is set to 0.5 pieces/second with δt = 10 seconds. The
shared file has B = 80 pieces. In our simulations, individual
peers significantly improve their performance by joining the
coalition compared to the case when they do not. These results
are not reported here due to space limits and we choose to
focus on the swarm performance instead.
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Fig. 5. Empirical upload capacity distribution from [13].
1) Coalition formed by low capacity peers: We first in-
vestigate whether a coalition formed by low capacity peers
improves performance. We let peers with capacity below the
50-th percentile (i.e., in the range [42.96, 77.40]KBps) in
Figure 5 form a coalition. We also consider the 70-th and 90-
th percentiles, corresponding to capacities about 112.87 KBps
and 391.45 KBps respectively, for forming coalitions.
In Figure 6, we plot the boxplots of the steady state
download completion times for different coalition sets, and
compare them with the case with no coalition. We can see that
coalition significantly improves the overall performance of the
swarm. For example, if peers with capacity below the 90-th
percentile join the coalition, the average download completion
time is reduced by over 20% compared to the case when
there is no coalition. In addition, the variance of download
completion times of the whole swarm is also significantly
reduced when peers with capacity below the 70-th or 90-th
percentiles form a coalition.
2) Coalition of randomly chosen peers: A newly arrived
peer joins the coalition with probability pjoin. We vary pjoin
as {0, 0.1, 0.5, 0.9, 1.0}, and for each value of pjoin, we record
the file download completion time of peers that join and com-
plete their downloads during steady state. In Figure 7, we plot
the boxplots of the steady state download completion times.
We see that the overall system performance is significantly
improved even when peers randomly join the coalition. It
is interesting to note that the best performance occurs when
90% of peers join the coalition, instead of 100%. This can be
explained as follows. When all peers join the coalition, the
coalition has more low capacity peers, which leads to a worse
performance than the case when pjoin = 0.9. Even then, it
significantly outperforms the case with no coalition. Note that
the extra 10% (= 100%− 90%) of the peers are mainly low
capacity peers, as can be seen from Figure 5.
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Fig. 6. Boxplots show the median
and percentiles (25, 75). Diamonds
show the average. Four cases: no
coalition, and coalitions of users with
capacity below the 50-th, the 70-th
and the 90-th percentiles.
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Fig. 7. Boxplots show the me-
dian and percentiles (25, 75), and di-
amonds show the average download
completion time. The labels on x-axis
represents different pjoin.
Remarks. If we compare the fourth boxplot (from the left)
in Figure 7 with the boxplots in Figure 6, we see that a
coalition of randomly chosen peers yields better overall swarm
performance than the coalition composed only of low capacity
peers. This is because a few of the high capacity peers join the
coalition when peers are randomly picked to join the coalition.
We also investigate the case when there are multiple coali-
tions in the swarm. Specifically, we simulate two coalitions
in a swarm with peer capacities chosen according to the
empirical distribution in [13]. A newly arriving peer with
capacity below the qlow-th percentile of the distribution will
join coalition 1, but if its capacity is above the qhigh-th
percentile of the distribution, it will join coalition 2. We vary
qlow as {10, 50, 90} when qhigh = 10, and vary qlow as
{10, 50, 70} when qhigh = 30. Again, we find that in each
scenario, forming two coalitions significantly improves the
whole swarm’s performance.
B. Dynamic Coalition Formation
Similar to [18], we next study whether coalition size con-
verges to a fixed value when peers use the cooperation-aware
better-response strategy proposed in our previous work [18].
We improve the strategy in [18] to allow a peer to join any
coalition regardless of its capacity class.
1) Improved cooperation-aware better-response strategy:
Suppose that there are multiple coalitions in the swarm. The
basic idea of this strategy is that a peer always attempts to
join the coalition with maximum rate, but will not change
membership if its own rate is no less than its coalition
average rate (discounted by a non-cooperation factor, denoted
as β). The larger the β, the more non-cooperative a peer is.
Specifically, peer j makes a decision every r · δ time units,
where δ is the re-choking interval length, and r > 0 is
referred to as the patience factor. A larger r implies that the
peer makes decisions of whether to remain in the coalition
or not over a longer time period. When making a decision,
the peer compares its own download rate with the average
download rate of its own coalition (if it is in a coalition), and
the maximum average download rate across all coalitions. All
three rates are averaged over the last r · δ time units. The
average download rate of a coalition is discounted by β. If a
peer is currently not in any coalition and its own rate is less
than the maximum rate, then it joins the coalition with the
maximum rate. If a peer is currently in a coalition and its own
rate is no less than its coalition’s average rate, then it stays in
the coalition; otherwise if its own rate is less than its coalition
rate and less than the maximum rate, then it joins the coalition
with maximum rate (if not in it yet). A peer leaves its coalition
if its rate is less than its coalition’s rate and its coalition is
the one with maximum rate. In the following, we report our
results on a swarm consisting of only one coalition and on a
swarm with two coalitions.
2) Only one coalition in a swarm: In this scenario, a newly
arrived peer joins the coalition with a fixed probability qinit,
taking values 0.1, 0.5, 0.9. Peers update their coalition mem-
bership three re-choking intervals after their arrival, using the
above mentioned cooperation-aware better-response strategy.
We consider different values of r and β, viz, r = 1, 5, or 10,
and β = 0.1, 0.5, or 1.0. In our simulations, the coalition size
is always stable after 2000 seconds into the simulation. For
example, Figure 8 shows that the number of peers in coalition
set is stable in steady state when r = 10, β = 0.5, qinit = 0.1.
Even though a newly arrived peer joins the coalition with low
probability 0.1, eventually the coalition is attractive enough
such that more than 50% of the peers end up in a coalition
on average. [18] shows the dynamic stability of coalitions, but
each coalition only consists of peers with the same capacity.
Our results here show that the coalition size stabilizes in steady
state, even if the coalition consists of peers with heterogeneous
capacities.
We compare the average fractions of peers that are in the
coalition in steady state across all different combinations of
β, r, and qinit. Similar to the two capacity class scenario
considered in [18], we observe that as β increases, the coalition
sizes decreases, as peers become less cooperative. Also the
coalition size increases as r increases (peers are more patient).
And, when β < 0.5, regardless of values of qinit and r, the
coalition is always able to keep more than 50% peers (out of
the whole swarm) in the coalition.
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Fig. 8. Number of peers in a swarm
with one dynamic coalition.
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Fig. 9. Numbers of peers in a swarm
with two dynamic coalitions.
3) Two coalitions in a swarm: In a swarm with two
coalitions, we find that our cooperation-aware better response
strategy yields stable coalitions in steady state for any combi-
nation of β and r, with values in {0.1, 0.5, 1.0} and {1, 5, 10}
respectively. We simulate three cases, viz. a peer with capacity
below the x-th (x = 50, 70, 90) percentile initially joins
coalition 1. We observe stable coalitions in each scenario.
Figure 9 shows the number of peers in swarm when β = 0.5
and r = 1.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Based on the encouraging preliminary results in our previ-
ous work [18], we proposed a detailed yet flexible analytical
model for coalitions in a swarming system. Our model yields
optimal parameter settings for the random choking strategy
for a coalition. We also proposed a piece selection strategy to
improve the data availability for a coalition. We demonstrated
that coalitions yield significant performance improvement for
the whole swarm, and we further showed that coalitions can
be reached and remain stable if peers adopt an enhanced
cooperation-aware better-response strategy when they dynam-
ically join or leave a coalition. For future work, we plan to
investigate the upload capacity allocation strategy of peers
in a coalition, and formally analyze the dynamic stability of
coalitions.
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VII. APPENDIX: FIND P (B)
Case where i ≥ j. If ℓ > j, we always have P (Bℓij = 1) = 0.
We also assume that P (B1ij = 1) = 1−
(
B−j
i−j
)/(
B
i
)
.
In ℓ-th slot with 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ ϕj and ℓ <= j,
P (Bℓij = 1)=P (B
ℓ−1
ij = 1)P (B
ℓ
ij = 1|B
ℓ−1
ij = 1)
+P (Bℓ−1ij = 0)P (B
ℓ
ij = 1|B
ℓ−1
ij = 0)
=P (Bℓ−1ij = 1)P (B
ℓ
ij = 1|B
ℓ−1
ij = 1)
If Bℓ−1ij = 0, then pi is not interested in pj in ℓ-th slot.
P (Bℓij = 1|B
ℓ−1
ij = 1)
=1− P (Bℓij = 0|B
ℓ−1
ij = 1)
=1−
1
P (Bℓ−1ij = 1)
·
(
B
ℓ−1
)(
B−(ℓ−1)
j−(ℓ−1)
)(
B−j
i−(j−(ℓ−1))
)
(
B
i
)(
B
j
) (17)
Case where i < j. If ℓ > j, we always have P (Bℓij = 1) = 0.
In the ℓ-th slot where 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ϕj and (ℓ − 1) < j − i and
ℓ ≤ j, we have P (Bℓij = 1) = 1. At the beginning of this slot,
pi has i + ℓ − 1(< j) pieces, thus, pi is always interested in
pj .
In the ℓ-th slot where 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ϕj and (ℓ − 1) ≥ j − i
and ℓ ≤ j. These are the cases that the probability of pi being
interested in pj is less than one. At the beginning of this slot,
pi has i+ ℓ− 1(> j) pieces, thus, pi has more pieces than pj ,
but they have ℓ− 1 common pieces.
P (Bℓij = 1)=P (B
ℓ
ij = 1|B
ℓ−1
ij = 1)P (B
ℓ−1
ij = 1)
P (Bℓij = 1|B
ℓ−1
ij = 1)
=1− P (Bℓij = 0|B
ℓ−1
ij = 1)
=1−
1
P (Bℓ−1ij = 1)
(
B
ℓ−1
)(
B−(ℓ−1)
j−(ℓ−1)
)(
B−j
i−(j−(ℓ−1))
)
(
B
i
)(
B
j
) (18)
Here, since ℓ− 1 ≥ j − i, thus, i− (j − (ℓ− 1)) >= 0.
